Limitation:
The magnitude and details of budget cuts are not yet known, nor is the degree to which other international partners might step in to restore budget shortfalls.
Conclusion:
Scaling back international aid to HIV programs will have severe adverse clinical consequences; for similar economic savings, certain programmatic scale-back choices result in less harm than others. 
Primary Funding

F
or over a decade, the international HIV research and implementation communities have concentrated on scaling up HIV treatment and prevention activities. More recently, they have focused on optimizing investments in meeting the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 90 -90 -90 targets by 2020 -to diagnose 90% of persons living with HIV, link 90% of persons diagnosed with HIV to antiretroviral treatment (ART), and achieve 90% virologic suppression among those in treatment-and ending the AIDS epidemic (1) . The clinical benefit and economic attractiveness of such a scale-up, if not its feasibility in the wake of a global economic crisis, are well-established (1) (2) (3) (4) .
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, global HIV programs enjoyed robust support and success in providing ART and HIV prevention activities to resourcelimited settings (5) . In the past decade, however, funding has plateaued, suggesting donor fatigue and mounting political resistance worldwide (6) . Opposition to increasing investment in the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) surfaced in 2008, when the Obama administration and some health and development experts openly questioned the plan (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) . Most recently, the U.S. government proposed cutting the U.S. foreign aid budget by one third, affecting more than $6.7 billion currently earmarked for HIV/ AIDS prevention, care, and research under PEPFAR; The Global Fund to Fight HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria; the National Institutes of Health; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (13, 14) . Although it claims that U.S. aid will provide "sufficient resources to maintain current commitments," the proposal jeopardizes both the current pace of HIV treatment scale-up and the accelerated pace toward 90 -90 -90 (13, 15) . Finally, in 2014, the Global Fund began to exclude middle-income countries from future HIV/AIDS support; PEPFAR made similar plans for some Caribbean countries, suggesting that both multilateral and bilateral agencies have already begun to triage support for HIV/AIDS (16, 17) .
To date, research on global financing for HIV prevention and care has focused on questions of scale-up and budget expansions. Little is known, however,
The Current Standard and Scale-Back Strategies
The current standard emulates the status quo in RSA and CI, calibrated and validated to current data and guidelines ( Table 1 and Appendix Table 1 , available at Annals.org) (2, 22, 25) : HIV detection leads to ART initiation (mean CD4 count, 0.260 × 10 9 cells/L) (28, 29) ; everyone is eligible for ART, regardless of CD4 count; and 5-year retention in care is 84% (30 -32) . Although routine viral load (VL) monitoring is largely available in RSA, access is limited in CI (about 7% in 2016); second-line ART is available in both settings (22, 23, 25) .
We defined scale-back strategies encompassing a selection of programmatic alternatives ("policy levers") available to national health authorities if funds are decreased (Appendix Table 1 ). Strategies 1 through 3 relate to entry into care and ART initiation criteria; strategies 4 through 6 apply to persons already receiving treatment and anyone newly initiating ART.
Strategy 1: No new ART. ART continues for patients already in care, but HIV screening activities are suspended and no new offers of treatment initiation are made. We assume that commitments to provide treatment to anyone already receiving ART are maintained (13, 52 (54) .
Strategy 4: Reduced retention. This strategy simulates fewer clinics and providers, longer wait times, and limited investment in retention and adherence. Under this strategy, the fraction of patients receiving ART and retained in care at 1 and 5 years falls from 96% and 84% (current standard), respectively, to 92% and 70%.
Strategy 5: No VL testing. All VL testing (routine and confirmatory) is eliminated and replaced with twiceannual CD4 counts to monitor ART success. This strategy applies only to RSA.
Strategy 6: No second-line ART. Patients whose first-line ART has failed are given adherence counseling and an opportunity for first-line resuppression (as under current standard) but not for switching to a secondline regimen.
To study potential offsets or synergies of clinical outcomes and cost-savings, we also examined the following combinations of the strategies: 1) late presentation and ART eligibility at CD4 count less than 0.350 × 10 9 cells/L; 2) late presentation and reduced retention; 3) ART eligibility at CD4 count less than 0.350 × 10 9 cells/L and reduced retention; 4) late presentation, ART eligibility at CD4 count less than 0.350 × 10 9 cells/L, and reduced retention; and 5) no VL testing and no second-line ART (only for RSA).
To help stakeholders understand the clinical and fiscal consequences of alternative choices, we report the absolute and proportional changes in transmissions, deaths, years of life lost, and budget for each scale-back strategy compared with the current standard on an undiscounted basis. Then, adopting the perspective of the in-country decision maker, we report discounted outcomes, seeking to identify the least harmful way of achieving a given level of budget reduction. 
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Cohort Definitions
At model outset, we defined the current population-the "2016 prevalent cohort"-of HIV-infected adults (aged ≥15 years) using country-specific data on the proportion of persons currently in each stage of care (Table 1) (24, 28, 34 -36) . In each subsequent year, we introduced a new incident cohort and combined outcomes from all prior incident cohorts and the 2016 prevalent cohort.
The CEPAC-I Model
CEPAC-I is populated with natural history, treatment, and cost data from RSA and CI (35, 55) . Random draws from distributions generate individual patient characteristics (such as age), some of which (such as CD4 count) are specific to HIV detection and treatment stage ( Table 1 , top). CEPAC-I simulates HIV detection, linkage to care, ART initiation, virologic suppression, and care retention. It also simulates the natural history of untreated HIV disease, including immunologic or CD4 decline and increased risk for opportunistic diseases. Development of an opportunistic disease or intermittent HIV screening enable HIV detection. Patients virologically suppressed by ART have a CD4 count increase; those who are not suppressed achieve no CD4 count increase and accrue ART costs (37, 38, 55) .
For both countries, the 48-week virologic suppression rate is 78% for those initiating first-line ART, with an opportunity for resuppression after first-line failure (54% suppression at 16 weeks) (40, 41). In RSA, HIV RNA monitoring occurs according to country-specific guidelines; HIV RNA is not routinely monitored in CI (22, 23, 25) . Patients in whom first-line ART failure is again detected after an opportunity at resuppression may be switched to a second-line regimen if they meet national criteria for switching (22, 25) . In the current standard, patients in care face a monthly risk for loss to follow-up ranging from 0.2% to 1.1%, depending on adherence; this results in an 84% probability of remaining in care after 5 years (30 -32).
Transmissions
Total monthly transmissions were computed by multiplying published estimates of VL-specific transmission rates (Table 1 ) (43, 44) by model-generated estimates of patients in each VL category. These categories depended on both baseline HIV RNA (39, 42) and clinical status: acutely infected (56), virologically suppressed, either becoming suppressed or rebounding, or advanced disease (CD4 count <0.200 × 10 9 cells/L). During the 6 months of acute infection, we amplified transmissions 7.25-fold (44) . We also reduced transmissions to reflect population-specific rates of condom use (RSA, 29.0%; CI, 28.8%) (45) (46) (47) .
Costs
In both RSA and CI, first-and second-line ART costs are $114 and $331 per year, respectively (57). Care costs related to HIV differ between countries and include opportunistic disease treatment, laboratory monitoring, and CD4-stratified routine care costs ( Table 1) . For example, CD4-stratified routine care costs (excluding ART and laboratory costs) range from $18 to $140 per month in RSA and $26 to $36 per month in CI (48 -50) . Per-patient annual costs (in HIV care) from model output were validated to published data in RSA and other similar settings (2, 58, 59) . Although derived similarly from CI-specific cohorts, CI aggregate costs were not externally validated because few CI-specific microcosting reports have been published (48 -51) .
Role of the Funding Source
This research was funded by the National Institutes of Health and by the Steve and Deborah Gorlin MGH Research Scholars Award. The funding sources had no role in the design, analysis, or interpretation of the study or in the decision to submit the manuscript for publication.
RESULTS
Clinical Outcomes
Under the current standard, 3.240 million new HIV transmissions will occur in the next 10 years in RSA. In the same 10-year period, HIV-infected South Africans will experience 4.258 million deaths and 63.957 million person-years of life. In CI, 225 000 new HIV transmissions are projected in the next decade, with HIVinfected persons experiencing an estimated 270 000 deaths and 4.234 million person-years of life ( Table 2 ) (Appendix Tables 2 to 6, available at Annals.org, present these results at 2, 5, and 10 years and as a percentage of change from the current standard). Compared with these benchmarks, every scale-back strategy would result in more HIV transmissions, more deaths, and fewer years of life over a 10-year horizon. In RSA, the increase in transmissions would range from 38 000 (1.2%, with the no second-line ART strategy) to 630 000 (19.4%, with the no-new-ART strategy) and the increase in deaths would range from 31 000 (0.7%, with the no second-line strategy) to 1.664 million (39.1%, with the no-new-ART strategy). Similar results would be seen in CI, with the largest increase in transmissions (24 000 [10.5%]) and deaths (93 000 [34.6%]) occurring under the no new ART strategy.
Budget Impact
The scale-back strategies would produce 10-year decreases in financial outlays ranging from Ϫ$320 million (Ϫ1.0%; that is, cost increases) to $7.740 billion (24.1%) in RSA and $10 million (0.7%) to $420 million (28.1%) in CI. These findings suggest that budgetary savings of up to 30%, but no greater, can be achieved over the next decade using the scale-back strategies we examined. Moreover, scale-back strategies would not produce constant changes in annual outlays over time (Table 2, Figure 1 , and Appendix Tables 3 and 5). The no-VL strategy in RSA, for example, would produce a small cost-savings over 2 and 5 years ($300 million and $230 million, respectively) but increased cumula-
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tive outlays by year 10 because of less sensitive methods to detect ART failure and increased costs of second-line ART ( Table 2 and Appendix Tables 3 and  5) . By contrast, the savings from the no-new-ART strategy would approximately triple in RSA and CI from $2.680 billion and $120 million, respectively, over 5 years (Appendix Tables 3 and 4) to $7.740 billion and $420 million, respectively, over 10 years. The large savings under the no-new-ART strategy reflect high mortality caused by not treating newly infected cases (Table 2 and Appendix Table 2 ). The budgetary savings from any given scale-back strategy are almost always proportionally greater in CI than RSA owing to the greater relative cost of drugs versus labor in CI.
Proportional Clinical Harm and Budgetary Benefit
In RSA, nearly every scale-back program would produce a higher percentage increase in adverse events (transmissions [ Figure 2 , A] and deaths [ Figure  2 , C]) than percentage decrease in outlays (Appendix Table 2 ) when compared with the current standard over 10 years. The no-new-ART strategy (dark blue triangle in Figure 2) is the only exception, where proportional savings (24.1%) would exceed the percentage increase in transmissions (19.4%). In CI, the increase in HIV transmissions resulting from any given scale-back strategy would be proportionally smaller than in RSA ( Figure 2, A and B) . This reflects proportionally higher HIV transmissions in CI than RSA under the current standard, given higher baseline levels of undiagnosed HIV infection and lower levels of virologic suppression in the absence of VL monitoring ( Figure 2, B and D) .
Combination Scale-Back Programs
Combining scale-back programs would produce some noteworthy interactions ( Table 2 , bottom; Appendix Table 7 , available at Annals.org). Some combinations would have roughly the same aggregate effect on transmissions, deaths, and budget as their individual component parts (for example, ART eligibility at CD4 count less than 0.350 × 10 9 cells/L and reduced retention). Other combinations would produce fewer adverse outcomes than the sum of their components (for example, late presentation and ART eligibility at CD4 count less than 0.350 × 10 9 cells/L). Still other combinations would yield lower budgetary savings than the sum of their parts (for example, no VL testing and no second-line ART). Figure 3 aims to inform decision making by portraying both discounted years of life lost (horizontal axis) and discounted costs (vertical axis) for each of the scale-back strategies. The bold lines represent the "efficiency frontier," a demarcation of the least harmful means of achieving any given reduction in the overall budget. Many strategies are on or close to the efficiency frontier in RSA at 10 years, including late presentation (13% budgetary savings), late presentation and reduced retention (16%), and no new ART (24%). In CI, the following 5 strategies create the efficiency frontier: no second-line ART (2% budgetary savings); reduced retention (7%); ART eligibility at CD4 count less than 
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Efficiency Frontiers
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Costs, $ (million)
In each pair, the left bar denotes 5-year outcomes, and the right bar 10-year outcomes. Alternative scale-back strategies are arrayed along the horizontal axis; the benchmark of the current standard is at the extreme left. ART = antiretroviral therapy; VL = viral load.
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ORIGINAL RESEARCH 0.350 × 10 9 cells/L and reduced retention (8%); late presentation, ART eligibility at CD4 count less than 0.350 × 10 9 cells/L, and reduced retention (19%); and no new ART (28%). Implicit in the shape of the efficiency frontier is a tradeoff between life expectancy and savings: For any budget cut greater than 10%, every year of life lost by implementing one of the programs at or close to the efficiency frontier will save roughly $900 in HIV-related outlays in RSA and $600 to $900 in CI.
DISCUSSION
Several key findings emerge from this analysis. First, the scale-back strategies we examine can accommodate budget cuts of up to 30%. Commitments to patients already receiving care for HIV make further budget contractions infeasible. Second, with few exceptions, any early cost-savings are likely to be offset by the downstream costs of increased HIV transmissions. Third, when compared with the current standard, 
Republic of South Africa Côte d'Ivoire
The figure compares the percentage increase in adverse events with the percentage decrease in financial outlays for each scale-back strategy relative to the current standard. The vertical axes denote the budgetary savings that can be achieved; the horizontal axes denote the concomitant proportional increase in transmissions (A and B) and deaths (C and D). The solid black line with slope equal to 1 represents the "line of identity"; this denotes instances where the percentage increase in adverse events equals the percentage decrease in financial outlays. Colored points denote different scale-back strategies; triangles indicate single programmatic cuts, and squares indicate combination programmatic cuts. Scale-back strategies that lie above the line of identity deliver greater proportional budgetary savings than the offsetting proportional increase they produce in transmissions or deaths. The figure reports the proportional increase in undiscounted adverse events produced by a given proportional reduction in the budget (undiscounted). It does not represent an assessment of economic value or incremental cost-effectiveness. Because of differences in the ratio of labor to ART costs between the 2 countries, most interventions in Cô te d'Ivoire save proportionally more money, exceeding the line of identity for transmissions and approaching it for deaths. ART = antiretroviral therapy; VL = viral load. 
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ORIGINAL RESEARCH nearly every scale-back strategy is likely to produce proportionally greater individual and population-level harm than economic savings. For example, although a strategy of decreased case identification (late presentation) reduces the HIV program budget (reduction in RSA, 13%; in CI, 13%), deaths are projected to increase (increase in RSA, 22%; in CI, 15%). Finally, our analysis likely underestimates the number of adverse outcomes by ignoring the "youth bulge" (that is, the demographic expansion in the number of teenagers and young adults-a subpopulation at high risk for new HIV infection-in many resource-limited nations with HIV epidemics) (60). In-country decision makers need to note the synergies and offsets that may exist among alternatives for budget cutting. Shared cost structures and competing risks for harm mean that the combined effect of simultaneously implementing more than 1 scale-back strategy may differ substantially from the sum of the individual effects. Moreover, these differences will fluctuate from one nation to the next, reflecting variation in the relative costs of health and medical inputs (for example, drugs and labor) and in clinical practices and HIV epidemiology.
Finally, we note that better and worse choices exist within this set of bad alternatives. If circumstances compel in-country authorities in RSA to cut their HIV spending dramatically, the following 3 scale-back strategies will, for example, produce budgetary savings ranging from $4.3 billion to $7.7 billion (13% to 24%) over 10 years while doing the least possible harm: delaying presentation to care by limiting HIV screening activities, delaying presentation while also reducing spending on care retention, or withholding all new ART initiation. In CI, implementing either of the following 2 scale-back strategies will produce budgetary savings of roughly $290 million to $420 million (19% to 28%) over 10 years: delaying presentation while simultaneously limiting ART eligibility to those with CD4 counts less than 0.350 × 10 9 cells/L and reducing spending on retention in care or withholding all new ART initiation. These findings should be interpreted with caution; they are proposed here as the least deleterious alternatives from a list of options that will all cause harm to clinical and public health. Indeed, for every year of life lost by implementing one of these strategies, the RSA HIV program will save roughly $900 in HIV-related outlays. In CI, with budget cuts of at least 10%, these scale-back strategies will cost a year of life for every $600 to $900 saved. We leave it to readers to draw their own conclusions about whether imposing such tradeoffs on vulnerable populations accurately reflects how donor countries value life in recipient nations.
Funding for HIV programs in resource-limited settings comes from domestic, multilateral, and bilateral sources. The mix differs from country to country, as does the type of care each funder supports. Our framework ignores domestic-and funder-specific details because they pertain to particular line items. This reflects our view that waning support for HIV programs is a general phenomenon and our reluctance to assume that a given funder will be willing and able to fill gaps created by other funders.
This analysis highlights the importance of considering both proportional and absolute costs of donor cutbacks to affected countries. Viewed on a proportional basis, the effect of cutbacks on smaller nations that depend more heavily on external sources will be devastating. In CI, for example, more than 90% of HIV financing comes from international sources (23) . A 10% cut in PEPFAR funding alone will reduce the overall HIV budget there by around 9%, or $20 million. Viewed on an absolute basis, the effect of cutbacks on larger nations with more generalized epidemics will also be devastating. In RSA, for example, where most HIV spending is self-financed, that same 10% cut in PEPFAR funding might represent only around 2% of the HIV budget but will produce a much greater $40 million absolute budgetary setback (27) . Both the proportional and the absolute magnitude of the costs of potential scale-backs will influence the extent to which nations are able to absorb those cuts.
Several limitations are noteworthy. First, we do not know how budget scale-backs will be imposed across recipient nations-whether all recipients would face the same, across-the-board, percentage reduction; cuts would be equally applied across expenditure types (for example, among infrastructure, laboratory, and drugs); or prevention and treatment programs would be handled differently. Furthermore, many types of program scale-backs probably exist aside from those we considered here. In our view, these represent the key uncertainties of our analysis. Although we have not done a more traditional, variable-driven sensitivity analysis, we have tried to manage the critical uncertainties by examining many venues, planning horizons, and budgetcutting scenarios representing relatively recent initiatives and program expansions. Finally, our analysis did not capture potential cost shifts due to reduced testing programs, overall clinic closures, repurposing of brickand-mortar clinic sites, or how program contraction would affect the growing workforce employed to combat HIV.
We have shown that scale-back of international aid to HIV programs in resource-limited settings will reverse enormous strides made over the past 20 years in curbing the global HIV epidemic and improving HIVrelated survival (61) . Our findings suggest that reduced HIV foreign aid will produce modest savings to donors at the expense of HIV epidemic revival and massive loss of life among recipient nations. Should these cutbacks materialize, in-country policymakers will be forced to confront profound ethical dilemmas in allocating remaining resources while minimizing-although not entirely avoiding-harm to individuals and communities. To be clear, we are neither endorsing any of these painful choices nor excusing the political decisions that may make them necessary. But we show that assessing the clinical, epidemiologic, and economic effects of alternative scale-back scenarios is possible and that some decisions made in response to the imposition of budget cuts will do less harm than others. 
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